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Brittain: Colleges and Universities: The Demise of in Loco Parentis

COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES:
THE DEMISE OF IN LOCO PARENTIS
Courts have a creative job to do when they find that
a rule has lost touch with reality and should be abandoned or reformulated to meet new conditions and
new moral values.
Roger J. Traynor,
Law and Social Change in a Democratic Society,
Illinois Law Forum 232 (1956)
INTRODUCTION

The relationship between the college student and his college' is a topic of considerable contemporary discussion. This
upsurge can be attributed to no single factor, but there is
little room for doubt that the law has had much to do with
it. In the past, the courts were reluctant to examine problems
that arose between the student and his college, the theory being
that it was not for the courts to interfere with a college's
authority.2 During this same period of time, legal scholars
gave little recognition to the potential rights and responsibilities of the college student.' However, with the Supreme
Court's predominant concern with civil rights,' the courts5
and legal authorities6 no longer feel so constrained.
Copyright @ 1971 by the University of Wyoming

1. The terms "college" and "university" will be used interchangeably in this
comment to refer to any non-private institution awarding earned degrees
of baccalaureate level or higher.
2. E.g., the New York Supreme Court, in reviewing the authority of college
officials, said 42 years ago, "the University officials have wide discretion . . ., and the courts would be slow indeed in disturbing any decision
of the University." Anthony v. Syracuse Univ., 224 App. Div. 487, 231
N.Y.S. 435, 440 (1928). The case involved dismissal of a girl from Syracuse University because she was not "a typical Syracuse girl".
3. E.g., 2 INDEX TO LEGAL PERIODICALS 240 (Oct. 1928 - Sept. 1931), under the
heading of Colleges and Universities lists only six law review articles which
deal with the legal relationships of a college and its students.
4. "[I]n the 1963-1964 Term of Court, forty of the fifty decisions accompanied by an opinion and concerned with constitutional questions, were
roughly within the 'civil rights-civil liberties' field, as reported by the
American Jewish Congress." Van Alstyne, Student Academic Freedom and
the Rule-Making Powers of Public Universities: Some Constitutional Considerations,2 LAW IN TRANSITION QUARTERLY 1, 13 n. 44 (1965).
5. E.g., Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 368 U.S. 930 (1961) ; Knight v. State Bd. of Educ., 200 F.Supp. 174
(M.D. Tenn. 1961).
6. In 15 INDEX TO LEGAL PERIODICALS 50 (Sept. 1968 - Aug. 1969) under the
heading of Colleges and Universities, there were twenty-nine articles dealing with the legal relationships of colleges and their students.
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The intent of this comment is to examine the doctrine of
in loco parentis' as a basis for the governing of students attending college. Consequently, there will be no in-depth
analysis of student rights as a whole, nor of any specific rules
and regulations, except when they are in point with the comment. Although the comment will deal with tile significance
of in loco parentis in all colleges, the University of Wyoming
will be used as a primary reference. The actual case law pertaining to colleges standing in the place of the parent is
relatively small and incomplete, hence there has been an incorporation of in loco parentis material from elementary
schools and secondary schools, with recognition of the fact
that such material may sometimes be inappropriate at the
higher educational level. Also, there has been reliance on
treatment of the subject in the non-legal fields such as education and sociology.
APPROACHES THAT DEFINE THE STUDENTCOLLEGE RELATIONSHIP

There are a variety of approaches a college may take in
justifying the use of rules and disciplinary actions. The approaches can generally be divided into three categories: nonconstitutional; constitutional; and statutory.' The constitutional approach is the latest to gain recognition, but it probably
occupies the dominant position in school law today. The
constitutional approach to defining student rights and responsibilities concerns itself primarily with the college student's rights as a citizen.9 It is established law today that the
student does retain his constitutional rights while attending
college.1" The Supreme Court in Tinker v. Des Moines Inde7. Since the doctrine of in loco parentis achieves such a common meaning in this
comment, it will no longer be italicized.
8. For a thorough analysis of these approaches see, Note, Private Government
on the Campus-JudicialReview of University Expulsions, 72 YALE L. J.
1362 (1963); Goldstein, The Scope and Sources of School Board Authority
to Regulate Student Conduct and Status: A Non-Constitutional Analysis,
117 U. PA. L. REV. 1045 (1968) ; Academic Freedom, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1045
(1968); Seavy, Dismissal of Students: Due Process, 70 HA.Rv. L. REV. 1406
(1957); Goldman, The University and the Liberty of its Students-A Fiduciary Theory, 54 Ky. L. J. 643 (1966).
9. For a detailed examination of the constitutional problems involved in college law, see, Van Alstyne, Student Academic Freedom and the Rule-Making
Powers of Public Universities: Some Constitutional Considerations, 2 LAW
IN TRANSITION QUARTERLY 1 (1965).

10. For the reader who assumed this was always the law, consider the court's
statement in North v. Board of Trustees:
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pendent School District stated the approach concisely when
it said: "It can hardly be argued that either students or
teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech
or expression at the school house gate."' 1
The statutory method of defining student-college relationships is found in a state's enabling acts. The acts usually
grant broad discretionary powers to those in charge of operating a college. The University of Wyoming's enabling act is not
unique in this respect.'" Wyoming Statutes provide that:
The board of trustees and their successors in office
shall constitute a body corporate by the name of "the
trustees of the University of Wyoming." They shall
possess all the powers necessary or convenient to accomplish the objects and perform the duties prescribed by law.' 3
The statutes further clarify this power by providing:
The president and the professors of the university
shall be styled "the faculty" and shall have power as
such a body to enforce the rules and regulations
adopted by the trustees for the government of the
students, to reward and censure students as they may
deserve, and generally to exercise such discipline, in
harmony with the said regulations, as shall be necessary for the good order of the institution.
Finally, there are approaches which might be loosely
classified is non-constitutional and non-statutory in nature.
Three primary approaches fall within this category. The first
approach is that the college and the student are in a contrac-

11.

12.

13.

14.

By voluntarily entering the university, or being placed there by those
who have the right to control him, he [the college student] necessarily
surrenders many of his individual rights. How his time shall be occupied; what his habits shall be; his general deportment; that he shall
not visit certain places; his hours of study and recreation-in all these
matters, and in many others, he must yield obedience to those who, for
the time being, are his masters. 137 Ill. 296, 306, 27 N.E. 54, 56 (1891).
393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969).
Compare, COLO. REV. STAT., § 124-5-1 (1963) § 1: "The Trustees and their
successors . . . may make by-laws and regulations for the well ordering
and government of the schools and its business not repugnant to the constitution and laws of the state."
WYo. STAT. § 21-352 (1957).
Id., § 21-338. The University of Wyoming has not ignored this power vested
in it. For example, REGULATIONS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF WYOMING BOARD OF
TRUSTEES, Pt. IV, § 2 provides that the University faculty can "establish
policies regarding student conduct and all phases of student life, activities
and student organizations." See also, STUDENT CONDUCT, RIGHTS AND
RESPONSIBILITIES,

RESOLUTION

OF

THE

TRUSTEES

OF THE

UNIVERSITY

OF

WYOMING (July 16, 1970).
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tual relation to each other.1 5 The courts have interpreted this
approach to mean that the college student agrees contractually
to obey the rules and regulations of his college.16 Typically,
the terms and conditions of such a contract are found in
school bulletins, admissions applications, and registration
forms."7 Lacking such specific clauses and conditions, some
courts have found an implied contract between the student
and the college."8
A second approach is based on a fiduciary relationship
between the college and the student. Essentially this approach
treats the college as a fiduciary; that is, "a person having a
duty, created by his undertaking, to act primarily for the
benefit of another in matters connected with his undertaking. ' This approach, however, would still seem to be on the
drawing board,"° for the courts have given it little recognition.2"
The third approach within the non-constitutional category
is the doctrine of in loco parentis which will be analyzed in
detail in the next section of the comment.
Although these are the three main theories in the nonconstitutional, non-statutory category, there are other possible
rationales that a college might use in formulation of university
standards.2 " The actual use of other approaches not previously
mentioned has been small and whether any of them would
constitute a single, distinct approach would be doubtful. Fur15. See generally, Note, Private Government on the Campus--Judicial Review
of University Ezpulsions, supra note 8.
16. Anthony v. Syracuse Univ., supra note 2.
17. Goldman, supra note 8, at 651.
18. Booker v. Grand Rapids Medical College, 156 Mich. 95, 120 N.W. 589 (1909).
19.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 13, comment a (1959).

20. The theory was first advanced by Seavey, Dismissal of Students: Due Process, 70 HARv. L. REv. 1406 (1957); and later discussed in more detail by
Goldman, The University and the Liberty of its Students-A Fiduciary
Theory, 54 Ky. L. J. 643 (1966). But see, Note, Legal Relationship Between
the Student and the Private College or University, 7 SAN DIEGo L. REv. 244,
261 (1970).
21. Only one case has been found to explicitly mention the fiduciary theory, and
it did so only in passing. Soglin v. Kauffman, 295 F. Supp. 978, 986 n. 6
(W.D. Wis. 1968).
22. E.g., Moore v. Student Affairs Comm. of Troy State Univ., 284 F. Supp.
725 (M.D. Ala. 1968) (formulating college regulations is an inherent power
in the college); Gott v. Berea College, 156 Ky. 376, 161 S.W. 204 (1913)
(making rules is a part of a college's basic purpose) ; John B. Stetson Univ.
v. Hunt, 88 Fla. 510, 102 So. 637 (1924) (the ability to make rules is the
result of long standing custom).
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thermore, it should be noted that all of the approaches mentioned above have been rather arbitrarily separated for the
sake of identification. A college or a court could resort to any
or all of these approaches in determining the status of a student in college."3
THE DOCTRINE OF IN Loco PAREnTIS

An early English decision defined in loco parentis as an
individual who assumes the parental character and discharges
the parental duties.24 Through the use of such a broad meaning, in loco parentis has been applied in a variety of situations.
Guardians,2 5 stepparents 6 and grandparents 7 have been determined to have the ability to stand in the place of the
parent. Generally, the effect of one standing in loco parentis
gives rise to the same rights and liabilities that the true parent
possesses.2 One who is in the position of being a quasi-parent
can discipline and punish the child,"9 although the extent and
nature of such punishment is not universally agreed upon.8
One definite limitation, however, is that the punishment administered cannot go beyond reasonable limits."' The reasoning behind this is that the punishment allowed an individual
is not a right of action as a surrogate parent, rather it is for
the welfare of the child."
The classic statement of a schools' ability to stand in loco
parentis came from Blackstone:
[A parent] may also delegate part of his parental authority, during his life, to the tutor or schoolmaster
of his child; who is then in loco parentis,and has such
a portion of the power of the parent committed to his
23. Because of the omnipotent abilities vested in the Constitution, the constitutional approach would merit consideration when discussing any of the
other approaches.
24. Wetherby v. Dixon, 34 Eng. Rep. 631 (Ch. 1815). See also, Howard v.
United States, 2 F.2d 170, 174 (E.D. Ky. 1924); BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
896 [4th ed. 1951].
25. Nelson v. Johansen, 18 Neb. 180, 24 N.W. 730 (1885).
26. Harris v. Lyon, 16 Ariz. 1, 140 P. 825 (1914).
27. Dodson v. McAdams, 96 N.C. 149, 2 S.E. 453 (1887).
28. Young v. Hipple, 273 Pa. 439, 117 A. 185 (1922).
29. "Child" in this context is used to denote anyone under twenty-one years
old or one not considered to be legally adult.
30. E.g., Steber v. Norris, 188 Wis. 366, 206 N.W. 173 (1925).
31. Holmes v. State, 39 So. 569 (Ala. 1905).
32. People v. Green, 155 Mich. 524, 119 N.W. 1087 (1909).

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1970

5

Land & Water Law Review, Vol. 6 [1970], Iss. 2, Art. 13
LAND AND WATER LAW REVIEW

Vol. VI

charge, viz. that of restraint and corrections, as may
be necessary to answer the purposes for which he is
employed."3
Blackstone makes it clear that a school's ability to stand in
the place of the parent is limited. By use of the word "may",
Blackstone implies that a parent could elect whether or not
the school should stand in loco parentis. Furthermore, the
statement sets a limit on the extent to which the delegated
parental authority may be exercised, i.e. "as may be necessary
to answer the purposes for which he is employed." It will
soon become evident, however, that American decisions have
not always followed Blackstone's rule.
A convenient place to start a discussion of in loco parentis as a basis for setting the nature and bounds of educational
authority is in the elementary schools. 4 It is in this area
that the concept still retains a certain amount of validity
and use. Furthermore, by examining the limits set upon the
doctrine in lower educational levels, it might be possible to
draw some conclusions as to its limits in colleges.
The school standing in loco parentis is one of the oldest
and most widely employed justifications for the use of disciplinary power. 5 The right to use discipline in the school is
looked upon as a common law privilege that allows it to escape any liability in tort. The Restatement has said that:
One who is charged only with the education or some
other part of the training of a child has the privilege of using force or confinement to discipline the
child only in so far as the privilege is necessary for
the education or other part of the training which is
committed or delegated to the actor. 6
33.

BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 453 (1870).

34. The word "schools" will be used here to mean only elementary and secondary
schools.
35. See generally, 43 A.L.R.2d 469 (1955); PETERSON-RoSsMILLER-VOLZ, THE
LAW AND PUBLIC SCHOOL OPERATION 401-27 (1968); RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
TORTS §§ 147-155 (1965); Clausen v. Pruhs, 69 Neb. 278, 95 N.W. 640
(1903).
36.

RESTATEMENT

(SECOND)

OF TORTS §

152 (1965).
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Sometimes this authority to discipline is formally enacted
into law. 7 However, where there is no statute, the common
law will prevail."
The ability of a school to assume a quasi-parental relationship can arise in a variety of contexts. Corporal punishment by a teacher is the most widely accepted instance of the
school standing in loco parentis. 9 As long as the discipline
does not exceed the bounds of reason and is not prompted by
malice,4" the courts will permit its use much as they permit
a parent to punish his own child. A 1905 Alabama court recognized this rule in the case of Holmes v. State:
One standing in loco parentis,exercising the parent's
delegated authority, may administer reasonable chastisement to a child or pupil to the same extent as a
parent himself; and to fasten upon him the guilt of
criminality he must not only inflict on the child immoderate chastisement, but he must do so with legal
malice or wicked motives, or else he must inflict on
him some permanent injury.4 '
Besides requirements or reasonableness and lack of malice,
other limitations on the use of corporal punishment require
that the type and extent of the punishment administered have
some relation to the sex, age, size and physical strength of the
42
pupil.
Problems that arise over the administering of corporal
punishment usually center around the meaning of "reasonableness ;" that is, was the type of punishment given commensurate
with the offense. One suggested test of reasonableness has
been to inquire: "Might a responsible parent under similar
circumstances [have] inflicted such corporal punishment ?"4
37. PURDON'S PA. STAT. ANN. § 24.13-1317 (1962):
Every teacher in the public schools shall have the right to exercise the
same authority as to conduct and behavior over the pupils attending
his school, during the time they are in attendance, including the time
required in going to and from their homes, as the parents, guardians
or persons in parental relation to such pupils may exercise over them.
38. REUTTER, SCHOOLS AND THE LAW 64 (1964).
39. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 36.
40. Dill v. State, 219 S.W. 481 (Tex. 1920); State v. Pendergrass, 19 N.C. 365
(1837).
41. Supra note 31 at 570.
42. Boyd v. State, 88 Ala. 169, 7 So. 268 (1890); Berry v. Arnold School Dist.
199 Ark. 1118 137 S.W.2d 256 (1940); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 150 (1965).
43. HAMILTON-REUTTER, LEGAL ASPECTS OF SCHOOL BOARD OPERATION 25 (1958).
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Formerly, when a question of reasonableness arose, the court
would create a presumption of reasonableness.4 4 However,
questions of reasonableness are now usually treated more as
a problem of fact, not presumption."
Except for the use of corporal punishment, there are differing views as to how far the school is able to replace the
parent. To Blackstone, the power to stand in loco parentis
had to be voluntarily delegated by the parent. The modern
view, because of compulsory education, and the obvious need
for a school to maintain order, is that a school will assume the
parental duties regardless of the parent's consent. 6 The
ability to stand in the place of the parent, however, must be
directly linked to the promotion of some educational purpose. "7
"Private matters unrelated to education are not within the
8
purview of the teacher under the concept of in loco parentis.""
The promotion of some educational purpose has been found to
grant the schools a control over a student's "health, proper
surrounding, necessary discipline, promotion of morality and
other wholesome influences. '"" As broad as this might seem,
however, it would be wrong to assume that a school possesses
parental power in all aspects of school life.5" For example,
disciplinary power does not always belong to the school when
the student is off the school grounds. The case of Dritt v.
Snodgrass"1 clearly pointed this out in striking down a school
regulation that prohibited pupils from attending social parties
during the school year. The court held:
When the schoolroom is entered by the pupil, the authority of the parent ceases, and that of the teacher
begins; when sent to his home, the authority of the
teacher ends, and that of the parent is resumed. For
his conduct when at school, he may be punished or
even expelled, under proper circumstances; for his
conduct when at home, he is subject to domestic control. 2
44. Drake v. Thomas, 310 Ill. App. 57, 33 N.E.2d 889 (1941).
45. Clausen v. Pruhs, supra note 35, Note, Private Government on The Campus
-Judicial Review of University Expulsions, supra note 8, at 1375.
46. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 153(2) (1965).
47. Guerrieri v. Tyson, 47 Pa. Super. 239, 24 A2d 468 (1942); State v. Burton,
45 Wis. 150 (1878).
48.

PETERSON-ROSSMILLER-VOLZ, supra note 35, at 404.

49.
50.
51.
52.

Richardson v. Braham, 125 Neb. 142, 249 N.W. 557, 559 (1933).
Lander v. Seaver, 32 Vt. 114 (1859).
66 Mo. 286 (1877).
Id. at 298.
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On the other hand, courts have upheld a teacher's disciplinary action against a student's misconduct outside of the school
if such discipline can be directly related to the keeping of
order within the school. The vague and general manner in
which these rules are stated has created considerable confusion
over the extent to which a school stands in the place of a
parent. Hence, a precise statement of the law of in loco parentis and its use in elementary and secondary schools today
would be a difficult, if not an impossible task to undertake.
As a doctrine, in loco parentis is so vague and potentially nebulous that it could be used as a justification for also most any
school regulation or disciplinary action." The courts have
traveled a considerable distance since Blackstone stated the
limits of the law. In fact, the link between corporal punishment and in loco parentis would seem to be the only wellsettled area of the law. Beyond that, there has been no definitive statement as to how far in loco parentis can be applied in
Stephen H. Goldstein, Assistant
school administration."
Professor of Law at the University of Pennsylvania, summed
up the problem very well when he said: "Neither the school
boards nor the courts have attempted to develop any consistent
theory of school board rule-making power over the pupil conduct or status." 5 A few court cases have arisen along this
line, yet they all fail to clarify the problem." Furthermore,
vague statements that define a school's assumed parental
power in terms of controlling general welfare and student
morality5 7 contribute nothing toward an understanding of the
law.
53. School expulsion or suspension provides a prime example. The deprivation
of an education is far more important than corporal punishment. Consequently, to employ the in loco parentis scheme to anything beyond corporal
punishment might not fit the intentions of the doctrine at all.
54. E.g., Deskins v. Gose, 85 Mo. 985 (1885) (court upheld pupil's punishment
for fighting on the way to school) ; Lander v. Seaver, supra note 50 (court
upheld a pupil's punishment for deriding the teacher outside the school
grounds); Douglas v. Campbell, 89 Ark. 254, 116 S.W. 211 (1909) (court
upheld a student's suspension for being drunk and disorderly off the school
grounds).
55. Goldstien, upra note 8 at 375.
56. People v. Mummert, 50 N.Y.S.2d 699 (1944) (court upheld the ability of
a principal to administer punishment); Phillips v. Johns, 12 Tenn. App.
354 (1931) (court denied a teacher's right to search a student for stolen
money). But see, Marlar v. Bill, 181 Tenn. 100, 178 S.W.2d 634 (1944);
Pendergast v. Masterson, 196 S.W. 246 (Tex. Civ. App. 1917); Hailey v.
Brooks, 191 S.W. 781 (Tex. Civ. App. 1916).
57. E.g., Richardson v. Braham, supra note 49.
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Two possibilities exist that might serve to clear up this
problem of vagueness. First is for the school boards to formulate clear statements about their power to stand in loco parentis." The second possibility rests with the courts. Already
several constitutional issues concerning schools are being
raised and the courts are indicating a willingness to examine
such issues. Although no case has expressly defined the limits
of the in loco parentis power in the schools, its application
could be limited by requirements such as procedural due process and general recognition of student rights."
The first judicial indication that in loco parentis might
also apply on a college level was not until 1866.0 However,
there is authority to the effect that the concept of undertaking
parental duties was employed by the colleges for some time
before the courts took official notice of it."' The use of in loco
parentis on the campus has its roots in a colonial era that
would be foreign to the contemporary colleges:
"[In loco parentis] was transferred from Cambridge
to America, and caught on here even more strongly
for very elemental reasons: College students were,
for the most part, very young. A great many boys
went to college in the colonial era at the ages of 13,
14, and 15. They were, for most practical purposes,
what our high school youngsters are now. They did
need taking care of, and the tutors were in loco
parentis."

58. In response to this suggestion, the court in State v. Burton said:
[The teacher] stands for the time being "in loco parentis" to his pupils
and because of that relation he must necessarily exercise authority
over them in many things concerning which the board may have remained silent ... [I]t would seem impossible to frame rules which would
cover all cases of insubordination and all acts of vicious tendency which
the teacher is liable to encounter daily and hourly. 45 Wis. 150, 155
(1878).
59. "The need for procedural fairness in the state's dealing with college student's rights to public education . . . should be no greater than the need
for such fairness when one is dealing with the expulsion or suspension of
juveniles from public schools."-Madera v. Bd. of Educ., 267 F. Supp. 356,
373 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). Cf. Woods v. Wright, 334 F.2d 369 (5th Cir. 1964);
Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. School Sys., supra note 22; Smith, School
Expulsions and Due Process, in CURRENT SCHOOL PROBLEMS 9 (Carroll ed.
1969).
60. People ex rel. Pratt v. Wheaton College, 40 Ill. 186 (1866).
61. Williamson, Do Students Have Academic Freedom? in THE AMERICAN STUDENT AND HIS COLLEGE 311 (Lloyd-Jones-Estrin ed. 1967).
62. Henry Steele Commanger made this comment in a letter to William Van
Alstyne who then included it in Van Alstyne, Procedural Due Process and
State University Students, 10 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 368, 377 & n. 83 (1963).
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Going beyond considerations of age, E. G. Williamson sees
three underlying reasons why early colleges so extensively
relied upon in loco parentis." First, the college felt obligated
to raise moral, well-mannered students and to this end they
played the role of the parent "to segregate, isolate and insulate
the students from the lawlessness characteristic of the frontier."" Furthermore, education and religion were closely
linked, and the college often assumed the parent's duty of
spiritual indoctrination. Thirdly, the early application of in
loco parentis "in determining the relationship between the
individual and his institution [arose] in the charge to the
faculty to become disciplinarians. ' '65 The early colleges took
full advantage of this omnipotent power vested in them. 6
The first case to allude to the ability of a college to stand
in loco parentis was People ex rel. Prattv. Wheaton College,
which judicially sanctioned the doctrine's use when the court
said:
A discretionary power has been given [college officials] to regulate the discipline of their college in such
a manner as they deem proper, and so long as their
rules violate neither divine nor human law, we have
no more authority to interfere than we have to control the7 domestic discipline of a father and his
family.
The Prattcase, however, is seldom used as authority for establishing the application of in loco parentis in the college.
The reason for this is probably because the doctrine's application is only referred to by analogy.
For the university officials who may have awaited specific judicial sanction of in loco parentis, the Kentucky Court
of Appeals in 1913 delivered a clear-cut application of the
concept, and just nine years later this was improved upon by
the Supreme Court of Florida. In the Kentucky case of Gott
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

Williamson, supra note 61, at 311-13.
Id. at 312.
Id. at 312.
North v. Bd. of Trustees, supra note 10.
People ex rel. Pratt v. Wheaton College, supra note 60, at 187-88. (The
case involved the suspension of a student for joining a secret society in
violation of the college's rules. Ironically, while the court was comparing
college authority to that of parental authority, it was the student's father
who was seeking a mandamus to compel reinstatement).
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v. Berea College,6 8 a restaurant owner in the town of Berea
attempted to procure an injunction against a private college's
regulation forbidding college students to eat at any place not
owned by the college. Employing the Pratt case in the opinion,6 the court said:
College authorities stand in loco parentis concerning
the physical and moral welfare and mental training of
the pupils, and we are unable to see why, to that end,
they may not make any rule or regulation for the
government or betterment of their pupils that a parent could for the same purpose. Whether the rules
or regulations are wise or their aims worthy is a
matter left solely to the discretion of the authorities
or parents ... and, in the exercise of that discretion,
the courts are not disposed to interfere, unless the
rules and aims are unlawful or against public policy."'
It is worth noting, however, that the Gott case was not the
typical instance of a college taking disciplinary actions against
a student. Furthermore, the case points out that the regulations had a special purpose in protecting students who were
poor and "unused to the ways of even a village the size of
Berea. 71
The case of John B. Stetson University v. Hunt (1924)72
did involve the relationships between a student and college.
Like Gott, the college was private. The suit was by a student
who claimed she had been maliciously expelled. In upholding
the college's ability to expel the student, the court employed
the exact language of the Gott decision." The court also
pointed out its reluctance to interfere with college authority,
saying that "every presumption must be indulged in favor
of the school authorities to the extent that they acted in good
faith, for the best interests of the school and the pupil." 74
68. 156 Ky. 376, 161 S.W. 204 (1913).
69. Id. at 207.
70. Id. at 206.
71. Id. at 206.
72. 88 Fla. 510, 102 So. 637 (1924).
73. Id. at 640.
74. Id. at 641.
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After the Hunt decision, the application of in loco parentis
to the college was not so extensively applied by a court again
until 1967."5 Because of this forty-three year lapse in judicial application of in loco parentis, several authorities have
assumed that the doctrine was dead ;76 one noted author called
it a "factual demise." 7 However, as the dissenting justices
pointed out in Poe v. Ullman," simply because a law has fallen
into disuse does not mean it is a "dead letter". In addition,
a great number of cases, while not specifically mentioning in
loco parentis, use language somewhat similar to that of the
Gott and Hunt decisions.7" Whether the courts in such cases
entertained any thoughts as to the use of in loco parentis in
college relationships can never be determined, although the
idea cannot be completely dismissed.
THE DEMISE OF IN Loco PARENTIS ON THE CAMPUS

While it may be slightly premature to administer the
final rites to in loco parentis as a basis for determining student-college relationships, death seems eminent. Specific case
law, constitutional law, legal and non-legal authorities, logic
and fact are all assaulting the validity of the concept as it applies to the modern college. The intent will now be to organize
and analyze these various lethal instruments.
Specific case law rejecting the use of in loco parentis on
the campus is not large. The first rejection of an attempt by
a college to justify its action through the assumption of parental powers occurred over eighty years ago in the case of
Common wealth ex rel. Hill v. McCauly. 0 The dispute arose
75. Goldberg v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 248 Cal. App.2d 867, 57 Cal. Rptr.
463 (1967).
76. McIlhenny, Due Process and the 'Private' Institution, in THE COLLEGE AND
THE STUDENT 326 (Dennis-Kauffman ed. 1966); Wilson, Freedom and
Responsibility in Higher Education, id. at 337. But see, Frankel, Rights
and Responsibilities in the Student-College Relationship, id. at 237; Mudinger, Campus Life in a Litigous Age, id. at 318.
77. Van Alstyne, Student Academic Freedom and the Rule-Making Powers of
Public Universities: Some Constitutional Considerations, supra note 9,
at 17.
78. 367 U.S. 497 (1961) (Although the Poe decision was discussiong statutory
law, not common law, the reasoning still has validity).
79. E.g., Pyeatte v. Bd. of Regents, 102 F. Supp. 407 (D.C. Okla. 1952); Connell v. Gray, 33 Okla. 591, 127 P. 417 (1912).
80. 3 Pa. C. C. Rep. 77 (C. P. Cumberland Cy. 1887).
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over the dismissal of a student for allegedly participating
in riotous conduct. The court found the dismissal to be invalid,
largely because of the manner in which the college deprived
the student of any voice in the affair. In apparent need of a
doctrine to justify the employment of such an absolute power
over a students' future, the college suggested that it possessed
the power of dismissal because the relation between student
and professor was similar to that existing between parent and
child. The court conceded that the argument was advanced with
"great earnestness and warmth," but rejected it, saying that
the doctrine could not be used to bar the court from interfering with manifestly unjust actions by a college. While the
case cannot be said to stand for the proposition that in loco
parentis in the colloge is invalid, it would seem to clearly indicate that the concept cannot be employed as an absolute license
to control the lives of students.
More recent judicial rejections of in loco parentis have
all occurred within the last three years. Although few in number, the cases are evidence of the courts' increasing reluctance
to base a college's power on a vague doctrine like in loco
parentis. The first of these decisions was handed down in the
case of Goldberg v. Regents of the University of California."'
Once again this was a dispute over a college's authority to
expel students. The expulsions were upheld by the court as
a reasonable use of a college's inherent power to govern and
discipline its students to the point of expulsion, providing
proper procedural steps are taken. By way of dictum, however, the court rejected the use of labels or fictions as justifications for the control of student conduct. The court said
that: "For constitutional purposes, the better approach ...
recognizes that state universities should no longer stand in
loco parentis in relation to their students."" A short time
later, a district court in Buttny v. Smiley 8 said: "We agree
with the students that the doctrine of in loco parentis is no
longer tenable in a university community. "" Shortly thereafter, the case of Moore v. Student Affairs Committee of
81. Goldberg v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., supra note 75.
82. Id. at 470.
83. 281 F. Supp. 280 (D. Colo. 1968).

84. Id.at 286.
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Troy State University" was decided. Although this was
another expulsion case, the crucial issue centered around the
college's right to search a dormitory room and then subsequently expel the room's occupant for possession of marijuana
seized in the search. The court upheld the use of reasonable
search and seizure as being an integral part of a college's
performance of its duty to operate an educational institution.
However, the court refused to permit the college to base its
right to dormitory search and seizure on in loco parentis,
when it said: "The college does not stand, strictly speaking,
in loco parentisto its students."" This time only seven months
elapsed before another district court found that: "The facts
of life have long since undermined the concepts, such as in
loco parentis, which have been invoked historically for conferring upon the university authorities limitless disciplinary
discretion.'""

While it must be conceded that statements condemning
in loco parentis in five cases do not necessarily overturn the
common law doctrine, it would be difficult to deny that any
similar decisions in the future will give considerable weight
to these opinions.
In contrast to the small number of cases which have specifically rejected the college's ability to undertake parental
authority, a great many colleges and educational authorities
have repudiated its contemporary vitality. There is no exact
method of determining how many colleges have administratively rejected the use of in loco parentis. The University of
California, at Berkeley, and perhaps all colleges in California, " have retreated from any further use of the doctrine. "
After appointing a commission to study the whole area of
campus rules and public law, Cornell University discarded any
continued use of in loco parentis.8 Cornell President James
85.
86.
87.
88.

284 F. Supp. 725 (M.D. Ala. 1968).
Id. at 729.
Soglin v. Kauffman, 295 F. Supp. 978, 988 (W.D. Wis. 1968).
Goldberg v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., supra note 75 (In light of this decision, it is doubtful whether California colleges would employ in loco
parentis any longer).
89. Van Alstyne, Student Academic Freedom and the Rule-Making Powers of
Public Universities: Some Constitutional Considerations, supyra note 9, at
17-18.

90. Sindler, A Case Study in Student-University Relations in THE FUTURE
ACADEMIC COMMUNITY: CONTINUITY AND CHANGE 119 (Caffrey ed. 1969).
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A. Perkins expressed the attitude of the college in disposing

of quasi-parental power, when he said: "None of us, least of
all the faculty and administration, much mourn the demise of

the tradition of in loco parentis.1 By implication, at least
three other colleges have declined to make any more use of
surrogate parenthood.9 2 Finally, in a concerted effort to

formulate a model code for student discipline, students and
faculty at the New York University of Law found in loco

parentis to be inadequate for defining the student-college relationship."

The widespread acceptance of such a model code

could result in a great many more colleges eliminating any
further use of acting the parent's role.
In addition to the judicial and institutional eliminations

of in loco parentis, a great number of individuals, both in and
out of the field of law, have declared their opposition to its
continued use. The rejection by such individuals has covered
the full spectrum of society, ranging from a current member

of the cabinet

4

to a college student. 5

By far the most vociferous condemnation of in loco parentis has come from those involved in studying the legal and nonlegal aspects of the educational process." While the non-legal
91. Perkins, The University and Due Process, at 1, Dec. 8, 1967 (Reprint of
address by American Council on Education, Washington D.C.) cited in
Powell, Comment, 45 DENVER L. J. 669, 671 & n. 4 (1968).
92.

Urban, In

Loco Parentis, in

PROCEEDING OF THE SEVENTEENTH

CONFERENCE OF THE ASSOCIATION

OFFICERS 168 (1966)

OF COLLEGE

AND

UNIVERSITY

ANNUAL

HOUSING

(rejection by Pennsylvania State University); The

American College and Some Legal Aspects of In Loco Parentis, 13 THE
NAT'L ACAC J. 6-10 (1968) (indicates probable rejection by Johnson State
College) ; Richardson, Recommendations on Student Rights and Freedoms,
39 JUNIOR COLLEGE J. 34 (1969) (probable rejection by Northhampton
County Area Community College, Pa.).

93. NEw YORK UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW, STUDENT CONDUCT AND DISCIPLINE
PROCEEDINGS IN A

UNIVERSITY

SETTING;

PROPOSED

CODES WITH COMMEN-

TARY, 1-30 (August, 1968).

94. R. Finch, Foreword in Symposium: The Campue Crises, 11 WILLIAM & MARY
L. REV. 575, 576 (1970).
95. One of the most interesting characterizations of in loco parentis this writer
has encountered, came from a student at the University of Texas: "In loco
parentis, that practice which encourages the will not to be curious, which
feeds our youth intravenously with noncontroversial pabulum, and which
engenders the wrong type of alma mater, should be abolished."

Lipscomb,

A Student Looks at Academic Freedom in Dennis-Kauffman supra note 76
at 291.

96. E.g., in a recent law review, in loco parentis was mentioned by name no
less than eight times by as many different writers, none of whom considered it to be a doctrine meriting continued enforcement. Beaney, Students,
Higher Education, and the Law, 45 DENVER L. J. 511, 513 (Special 1968) ;
McClellan, Comment, id. at 539, 542; McKay, The Student as Private Citizen, id. at 558, 560; Van Alstyne, The Student as University Resident, id.
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authorities have not been recalcitrant in withholding their
beliefs concerning in loco parentis on the campus, 97 the legal
writers have had the most telling effect on its decline. Their
criticisms have been able to factually and logically point out
the inconsistency created in the colleges by their use of assumed parental authority. 8 Although no single authority
could be said to speak for all the legal experts in college law,
William Van Alstyne,"9 a long standing advocate of student
rights, perhaps best summed up the general feeling of the
authorities concerning in loco parentis when he said: "It
simply blinks at reality to treat the mother and the college as
one and the same in drawing legal analogies, no matter how
frequently one refers to his alma mater for other purposes.'100
The ranks of authorities in education, however, are not
completely devoid of individuals who still see in loco parentis
as a valid concept."' Perhaps the strongest proponent of preserving quasi-parental powers on the campus is Clarence Bakken, Assistant to the Dean of Students, California State College at Long Beach. As recently as 1967, Mr. Bakken has expressed the belief that in loco parentis was a necessary doctrine
which served to prevent punishment of college students from
becoming solely punative. Mr. Bakken's thesis would seem to
be that without a continuance of in loco parentis discipline
will lose its educational aspect and any reasons for guidance
and counseling will be lost.0 2 Two other possible arguments
at 582, 590; Monypenny, The Student as Student, id. at 649; Stamp, Comment, id. at 663, 666; Powell, Comment, id. at 669, 671; Clifford, Comment,
id. at 675, 677.
97. E.g., Penny, Variations on a Theme: In Loco Parentis, 8 J. OF COLLEGE
STUDENT PERSONNEL 22 (1967) ; supra notes 76 & 92.

98. The criticisms will be dealt with specifically later in this comment.
99. Mr. Van Alstyne is a Professor of Law at Duke University and the author
of several law review articles concerning student rights, with special
emphasis on constitutional issues. Some of the articles for which he is
best known are: Van Alstyne, ProceduralDue Process and State University
Students, 10 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 368 (1963); Van Alstyne, PoliticalSpeakers
at State Universities: Some Constitutional Considerations, 111 U. PA. L.
REv. 828 (1963); Van Alstyne, Student Academic Freedom and the RuleMaking Powers of Public Universities: Some Constitutional Considerations,
2 L. IN TRANS. Q 1 (1965); Van Alstyne, The Student as University Resident, 45 DENVER L. J., 582 (Special 1968).
100. Van Alstyne, The Student as University Resident, supra note 99, at 591.
101. E.g., Bakken, The Legal Basis for College Student Personnel Work, 34 (STuDENT PERSONNEL SERIES No. 2, 1961); Bakken, Legal Aspects of In Loco
Parentis, 8 J. OF COLLEGE STUDENT PERSONNEL 234 (1967); Crookston, Is
In Loco ParentisDead?, 7 AFFAIRS OF COLOADO STATE UNIVERSITY 4 (1968).

102. Bakken, Legal Aspects of In Loco Parentis,id.
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have been advanced for the retention of in loco parentis in
the colloge. A recent survey of the parents of freshman attending the University of Michigan indicated that they wanted
the University to exercise more control over their children
than they often did themselves. ' Secondly, in the opinion
of one clinical psychologist, students attending college seek
to put the college in the role of a parent, they "attribute the
to university officials, whether
intention of parental behavior
0 4
or not it is in fact there.'

Although condemnation of in loco parentis by the courts
and educational scholars is strong, it is submitted that in the
light of contemporary conditions, the doctrine is self-discrediting. Any factual or logical application of in loco parentis
clearly indicates that it is ready to be interred. The criticism
will be divided into a historical analysis; a comparison of the
family and the college; a discussion of in loco parentis limitations; and a brief examination of constitutional considerations.
Although none of these categories is clearly divisible from the
others, they are sufficiently distinct to aid in clarification of
the fallacies that hide behind the college's undertaking of
parental authority.
Historically, the colleges were geared to teaching younger
students."0 5 These students lived in an era when the college
undertook the task of disciplinarian, as well as spiritual and
moral guide."0 However, the frontier has long since disappeared, the separation of church and state has been established,0 7 and the teacher no longer supplements his educational
duties with the monitoring of student morals and conduct outside the classroom.
Today's college student is much older than those who
formerly attended college. Modern prerequisites for attending college are a high school diploma. Therefore, nearly all
students are at least eighteen years old when they enter college
and before they graduate they have achieved the magic age
of twenty-one. According to the 1960 Census, there are more
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

Universita8 In Loco Parentis, 97 SCHOOL & SOcIETY 146 (1969).
Urban, In Loco Parentis, supra note 92, at 169.
Supra note 62.
Supra note 61.
Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952).

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol6/iss2/13

18

Brittain: Colleges and Universities: The Demise of in Loco Parentis
COMMENTS

1971

733

college students between the ages of thirty and thirty-five than
there are those under eighteen, the latter group comprising
only seven percent of total college enrollment." 8 The average
age of all college students is twenty-two." 9 On the basis of
this, it is questionable whether in loco parentis factually applies to very many college students at all. Since the quasiparental role is based upon the theory that one stands in the
place of the parent, the college student who is past the age of
majority and no longer subject to parental control a fortiori
would not be subject to a college's in loco parentis control."'
Furthermore, there are a great many college students between
the ages of eighteen and twenty who have been emancipated
and would be considered legally adult."' For example, the
college student (regardless of age) who is financially selfsupporting or is married could not logically or legally be considered subject to parental discretion, either directly or indirectly through an agency such as the college. When the number of college students who would no longer be considered
within the parent's realm of control is totaled, the greatest
majority of college students would not be subject to a college's
in loco parentis control. It seems highly inappropriate, therefore, that a college should be able to formulate regulations
under the guise of standing in the stead of the parent while
such regulations logically apply to only a minority of the
students.'
Also in a historical vein, it is worth noting that a great
many early colleges were private institutions. Most college
students today attend state supported colleges and universities. The distinction can be important; a state supported institution can use legislative enactments as a justification for
disciplinary action; but a private college must frequently employ common law principles, such as in loco parentis, for justi108.

109.
110.
111.
112.

U.S.. BUREAU

OF THE CENSUS,

DEP'T. OF COMMERCE,

Current

Population

Reports, Population Characteristics, Series P-20 n. 110, at 12 (July 24,
1961).
Id.
Blackstone recognized this same limitation. BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES
782-84 (8th ed., 1890, Bancroft-Whitney pub.).
Strickland, In Loco Parentis-Legal Mots and Student Morals, 6 J. or
COLLEGE STUDENT PERSONNEL 335, 337 (1965).
William Van Alstyne must be credited with exposing the writer to this
concept.
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fications of authority." 3 In both the Gott..4 and the Hunt".
cases, the courts upheld the use of surrogate parent power in
private colleges. Hence, the Gott and Hunt decisions could
very well have come about because of judicial reluctance to
under-cut any of the common law relied on by the private college for imposing authority. If this was the judicial rationale
for the application of in loco parentis on the campus, then it
falls short of any meaningful use by state supported colleges.
Finally, colleges in the past were generally small, closely
knit communities which, in some respects, duplicated family
life. A great number of colleges today, however, have many
thousands of students in attendance. It is an obvious fallacy,
therefore, to contend that a college with as many as eight
thousand students.. 6 duplicates in any manner the close supervision and personal relationship that the family maintains.""
In fact, an attempt to draw any comparisons between the
family and the college as a justification for in loco parentis
fails. The definition of in loco parentis" 8 implies that the
one permitted to assume a quasi-parental role does so on the
basis of some comparison between the true parent and the surrogate parent. For this reason, taking on parental authority
in the lower level schools makes some sense. In elementary
and secondary schools, the students are usually legal infants
who live at home. The school becomes a home away from home,
but it never completely replaces the home. While the pupil
is in school, the teacher exercises the parental perogatives
of discipline and control for a few hours each day. Since
lower level schools do not have exceptionally large student
bodies and the number of students in a single class is not excessively large, the schools are able to operate on a more
personal basis with the student.
The same comparisons between the public school and the
parent do not work on the college level. For one thing, the
113.
114.
115.
116.

See generally, McIlhenny, supra note 76.
Gott v. Berea College, supra note 68.
John B. Stetson Univ. v. Hunt, supra note 72.
Eight thousand students is approximately the number attending the University of Wyoming.
117. Van Altyne, Procedural Due Process and State University Students, supra
note 99, at 376.
118. See cases and materials cited supra note 24.
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age of the college student has already been shown to destroy
much of this comparison. In addition, most students no longer
live at home while attending college, thereby nullifying any
delineations between the cessation of the school's quasiparental power and the beginning of the parent's.
Finally, any basis for comparing the personal relationship
between the parent and child with the college and the student
lacks validity. Colleges are too large and the classes frequently too massive in size to duplicate the affinity created
by the family. The intimacy within a family serves important
purposes, for it creates in the parent a tolerance of a sibling's
misconduct and serves as a restraining force against excessive
punishment. 1 ' The student-college relationship is not created
out of love, hence the tolerance and restraint loses its motivation.'
Althought parental discretion might be transferrable by means of in loco parentis, the inherent limitations on
it are not.1 21
The lack of comparison between the family and the college can also serve to point out an even deeper problem of in
loco parentis. When the courts and colleges accepted the
ability to assume parental authority, they failed to recognize
any established limitations.'2 2 Limitations on the use of in
loco parentis in the lower level schools have been established
The colleges, however,
over a considerable period of time.'
119. Van Alstyne, ProceduralDue Process and State University Students, supra
note 99, at 376.
120. Cf., Lander v. Seaver, supra note 50.
121. Strictly speaking, the familial affection can never be transferred, in either
the lower level schools or the colleges. However, there might be some
reason to speculate that some type of personal affection can come about in
the public schools that cannot be duplicated in the colleges. This is due
mainly to the peculiar role of the public school teacher. The greatest
majority of in loco parentis cases in grade and elementary schools concern
punishment by the teacher. Blackstone referred to the teacher as did Henry
Steele Commanger. On the basis of this, the courts may have been comparing a teacher's role to that of a parent's, due primarily to a similarity
in personal contact. The modern college, however, does not achieve the
same student-teacher relationship. The college teacher is not meant to
fill a disciplinarian role with the students, such a function is usually left
to other administrative personnel. Hence, there is no comparison between
the public school teacher and the college instructor. If, in fact, the courts
did follow in loco parentis reasoning because of a teacher's more personal
role, it certainly would not apply on a college level.
122. "In college situations, courts have seemed to borrow in loco parentis' doctrines as sources of power without importing the limitations upon that
power." Note, Private Government on the Campus--Judicial Review of
University Expulsions, supra note 8, at 1379.
123. See notes 34-59 and accompanying text.
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have been limited only to compliance with human and divine
law. 124 The colleges, therefore, assumed a complete parental
role, not being limited to sanctions either on the school
grounds" 5 or in the name of education." 6 In short, in loco
parentis furnished the colleges with a vague, ill-defined power
that could be used to justify almost any type of discipline or
control over the student. Any doubts that such power can
exist can be quickly dispelled by examining the facts in the
Hunt..7 decision. There a student was summarily expelled
on the basis of vague generalized rules which the student
had allegedly violated.
Even if the college imported the public school limitations
of in loco parentis,"' it would do little to clarify the limits of
the doctrine. The point has already been made that, except for
the use of corporal punishment, the extent to which a pupil
in public school might be subject to various in loco parentis
sanctions is unclear. Since corporal punishment has no place
in the college, all that remains of quasi-parental limitations
are vague requirements of reasonableness of the rules and that
they be connected to the performance of some educational
function. Obviously these limitations do nothing to clarify
the extent to which a college can use in loco parentis power.
The governing of college students through the use of an
unlimited in loco parentis power can present many logical
inconsistencies. For one thing, the doctrine distorts any delineations between the individual as a college student and the
individual as a municipal, state and federal citizen. Since in
loco parentis knows no limitations, then presumably a college
can control its students on or off the campus. The result is
an overlapping of college rules with local, state and federal
laws. When a student violates an overlapping rule, he may be
subject to a "multiplicity of trials and punishments, exactlyto
the extent that the laws of these several jurisdictions happen
to overlap.'. 2 Although the law of double jeopardy merits
Supra notes 68 & 60.
Dritt v. Snodgrass, supra note 51.
See notes 47-49 and accompanying text.
John B. Stetson Univ. v. Hunt, supra note 72.
For a suggestion to this effect, see Note, Private Government on the Campus
-Judicial Review of University Ezpulsions, supra note 8, at 1379-80.
129. Van Alstyne, The Student as University Resident, supra note 99, at 598.

124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
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consideration, a common sense feeling of unfairness created
by overlapping rules should be enough to eliminate them. 18 0
One of the greatest logical inconsistencies with college
authority that acknowledges no limitations is that it can potentially exceed even parental limitations. It is extremely ironic
when a college can expell a sudent under the guise of in loco
parentis while a parent cannot expell a child from his home
without violating some law.'81 This also serves as a prime
example of how the intimacy between the parent and child has
no counterpart in the college.
A final logical inconsistency of an unlimited in loco
parentis power is that the doctrine can go both ways. Not only
can in loco parentis permit a college to discipline a student, but
it can also be used by the student to compel the college to act
in his best interest, much the same as a parent would.'8 2 Hence,
the college gains quasi-parental authority as well as the lia8 ' It would seem that few
bility of parental responsibility."
colleges today would be as willing to accept in loco parentis
responsibilities as they did its unlimited authority.
Not only is the unlimited nature of in loco parentis logically unsound, but it is probably unconstitutional in many
respects. The emphasis today is upon clear statements of a
student's rights and responsibilities. Dixon v..Alabama Board
of Education, the landmark case in this area, foretold the
demise of a college's use of vague discretionary powers when
the court said:
[O]ur sense of justice should be outraged by the
denial to students of the normal safeguards... It is
shocking to find that a court supports [the college]
in denying to a student the protection given to a
pickpocket." 4
180. Id. at 598-603 (discusses specific suggestions on eliminating this problem).
131. Van Alstyne, ProceduralDue Process and State University Students, supra
note 99, at 376.
132. Frankel, supra note 76, at 237.
133. A frequent reason as to the use of in loco parentis by a college acting in a
protective capacity is that the campus is an enclave that safeguards students from civil authorities. Thompson-Kelly, In Loco Parentis and the
Academic Enclave, 50 EDUC. RECORD 449 (1969).
134. 294 F.2d 150, 158 (5th Cir. 1961).

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1970

23

Land & Water Law Review, Vol. 6 [1970], Iss. 2, Art. 13

738

LAND AND WATER LAW REVIEW

Vol. VI

Since Dixon, the courts have clearly indicated that a college
student has rights that the Constitution will protect from
arbitrary infringement by a college.1"' If the student in the
Hunt case were to be expelled today in the same manner that
he was in 1924, there is little doubt that the courts would require either reinstatement or at least a fair due process hearing. In the face of this, to propose that a college can possess
unlimited in loco parentis power would seem absurd.
In order to drive the final nail into the coffin containing
the corpse of in loco parentis, specific rebuttal should be made
to those who would argue for retention of the doctrine. Clarence Bakken would seem to have largely defeated his own proposals when he said that careful consideration should be
made when questioning the application of rules regarding
housing and student activities to students over 21.1"' Since
it has already been shown that most students are over twentyone or the legal equivalent of it, Mr. Bakken's adament refusal
to attend the funeral of in loco parentis seems to take on much
less significance. Furthermore, what Clarence Bakken really
seems to be advocating is the creation of a more personal relationship between the college and the student. With this
argument there can be no disagreement, but the creation of a
personal relationship with the student need not depend on the
in loco parentis doctrine. A college does not have to play the
role of the parent in order to communicate or discipline its
students. The clinical psychologist who believed the students
were attempting to place the college in a parental role sees
little value in using in loco parentis as a means to fulfilling
the student's needs:
In loco parentis is a symphon [symptom] of a more
primary problem deriving its motive force from the
resentment students feel over the perceived neglect
of them as people and a failure to collaborate in helping them achieve their life's ambitions and goals.'"
135. See notes 4-6 and accompanying text; Van Alstyne, The Student as University Resident, supra note 99, at 592-94 (contains a very concise listing
of what procedures a college must follow to insure that a student is not
deprived of his rights).
136. Bakken, Legal Aspects of In Loco Parentis, supra note 101.
137. Urban, supra note 92, at 173.
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The University of Michigan's survey,"8' which indicated
a desire on the part of many parents to have the college discipline the students even more than the parent himself, has
revealed many faults. To begin with, such things as smoking,
drinking and sexual contacts ranked high on the list of those
things parents most wanted the college to control. Yet, these
are activities which a college cannot supervise unless they resort to complete dominance over the student's life, an unrealistic, if not illegal, proposal for most colleges today. On the
other hand, matters such as vocational or educational control
(which the college might be able to sanction), illicited a much
weaker response. As a report on the survey concludes:
Parents seem to need more information about how the
University of Michigan operates and the degree to
which students are allowed to exercise individual responsibility for their lives in both personal and academic areas."3 9
CONCLUTSION

Whether in loco parentis applies to the various levels of
schools in Wyoming has never been determined by an appellate
court. Furthermore, the state has never enacted a statute that
specifically deals with student conduct and discipline as an
extension of parental authority. " ' However, it was pointed
out earlier that assuming parental power is a common law
concept, and absent a statute, the common law will prevail.''
Should the need arise, therefore, Wyoming would probably
accept the common law use of in loco parentis.
The right of a college to formulate reasonable rules and
regulations for governing students is an undisputed neces138. Universitas In Loco Parentis, 8upra note 103.
139. Id. at 146.
140. WYo. STAT. § 21-194 (1957) provides:
The principal of any such high school, with the approval of the board
of trustees, shall make such rules and regulations as may be deemed
proper in regard to study, conduct and government of the pupils under
his charge; and if any such pupils shall not conform or obey the rules
of the school, they may be suspended or expelled therefrom by the
board of trustees.
See also, WYO. STAT. §§ 2-352 to -53 (1957) (University of Wyoming enabling acts) ; WYo. STAT. § 21-11 (1957) (this would appear to be the appropriate enabling act for the grade schools in Wyoming).
141. Supra note 38.
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sity.'4 ' The intent of this comment has not been to question
this right. However, while recognizing the need for rules and
regulations, one should seriously question the means used to
achieve this end. In loco parentis is a far too vague and unlimited a doctrine to govern a college. Its continued use flys
in the face of logic and constitutional rights. In short, the
time has come for all colleges and universities to recognize
in loco parentis for what it is-an out-moded doctrine that deserves no berth in a contemporary college. The University
of Wyoming should be no exception.14 3
If a college repudiates in loco parentis, it would not leave
itself powerless. In the early part of this comment several
approaches were mentioned as a basis for defining the studentcollege relationship, Although the constitutional and statutory approaches appear to be the best, any one of the approaches would provide a suitable alternative to in loco parentis. There is no reason why a college should have to rely on
assumed parental powers and all their inconsistencies when
established alternatives exist.
To bury the doctrine of in loco parentis could do much to
help solve the frequent problems a college encounters when
it asserts its authority. Colleges across the country have often
been the site for student protests and disturbances. The subject of these protests has often centered around a college's
methods of administration."' Although there is no guarantee
that elimination of in loco parentis would solve the collegestudent problems, it certainly would contribute to an elimination of the uncertainty that now surrounds college administration. On one hand, college students should have a right to
have it made clear what the college expects of them and what
the results will be if they do not live up to those expectations.
Conversely, clear and unambiguous rules and regulations
142. E.g., Soglin v. Kauffman, supra note 87.
143. The possible use of in loco parentis at the University of Wyoming certainly
cannot be ruled out. For example, the language employed by the University
in its manual, STUDENT CONDUCT RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES, RESOLUTION
OF THE TRUSTEES OF THE UNIVERSITY OF WYOMING (July 16, 1970), is much
the same as the language used in the Gott and Hunt cases. Furthermore,
Berea College, although a private college, had drawn up its own enabling
act with language very similar to that of the University of Wyoming's.
144.

Peterson, Organized Student Protest in 1964-65, 30 J. OF THE NAT'L Ass'N
OF WOMEN'S DEANS AND COUNSELORS 50 (1967).
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would no longer force the college into ad hoc policy formation
that might be regretted later.
In addition, the courts have made it clear that the days
of reviewing a college's use of authority only in extreme instances are now gone. Reasonable rules reasonably applied has
increasingly become a judicial requirement for the colleges.
For a college to void in loco parentis would go far in eliminating the possibility of a court overturning a college's future actions. Simply put, the best way to avoid losing the power a
college has is for the college to avoid abusing it.
The only argument of merit that has been advanced for
the retention of in loco parentis is that the student and the
college need to communicate on a more personal level, one
comparable to that of the family. While the basic idea is sound,
its application through in loco parentis is not. Colleges in the
past have been too fond of employing the magic words "in
loco parentis", yet failing to use them as a means of relating
to the student. If the ability of a college to call itself a parent
is removed, it in no way affects the college's ability to communicate with the student body. It is not a problem of the
words a college uses to describe its attempts at communication,
but whether it is in fact communicating in meaningful ways.
In fine, it can be said that whatever validity, if any, in
loco parentis might once have had at the college level, it no
longer exists. If nothing else, the doctrine should die of extremely advanced age.
KERRY ROBERT BRITTAIN
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